The diversion of development aid to the recipient's military may be one explanation why aid is often found to be ineffective in promoting economic growth and development. Previous studies have not derived the causal effects of development aid on military expenditure. Using a new instrumental variable strategy, we examine whether bilateral development aid increases military expenditure in recipient countries. The instrument is the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid. The dataset includes new data on military expenditure for 124 recipient countries over the 1975-2012 period. While development aid has a positive effect on military expenditure in the full sample, the effect vanishes when we exclude outliers. However, we find that aid provided by coordinated market economies increases military expenditure in the full sample of recipient countries, even after controlling for outliers. Coordinated market economies have been found to deliver more government-to-government aid, which has a higher risk of capture compared to aid delivered through non-state development actors.
Introduction
Donor countries provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to promote economic growth and development in recipient countries. Scholars disagree, however, as to whether development aid is effective in achieving these goals (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004 , Dalgaard et al. 2004 , Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008 , 2011 , Dreher and Langlotz 2015 . It is conceivable that aid is ineffective because it is not used for its intended purpose, indicating that aid is fungible. Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments in recipient countries have used development aid to rig the military. In June 2015, for example, The Telegraph reported "British aid billions 'subsidising' third world defense budgets." 1 Finding evidence on whether "aid buys guns" therefore helps to explain why aid is often found to be ineffective.
A direct effect of diverting aid to unintended purposes such as increasing military activity is that the funds to execute intended development projects are missing. These absent funds are likely to confine the overall growth effects of development aid. More indirectly, even if development aid was used for the intended projects, the recipient government can use the freed-up financial resources for other purposes it would not have subsidized otherwise, such as military expenditure. Rising military expenditure, in turn, is likely to influence the country's level of violence and conflict. While military expenditure can have a stabilizing effect on conflict, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) show that increasing military expenditure has a destabilizing effect through accelerating the risk of conflict. In a similar vein, Pamp et al. (2016) find that extending mid-and long-term arms imports lead to a higher likelihood of sparking a new intrastate conflict. An increased risk of violence and conflict may, in turn, decrease economic growth. Consequently, increasing military expenditure might offset, or even exceed the positive effects of aid, resulting in no significant impact of aid on growth at the macro-level.
Previous studies examine correlations between aid and military expenditure and provide mixed evidence on the nexus between the two (Cashel-Cordo and Craig 1990 , Khilji and Zampelli 1994 , Feyzioglu et al. 1998 . Two studies have advanced empirical research by using instrumental variables (IV) for aid (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Kono and Montinola 2012) . The results show that aid increases military expenditure, especially in autocracies. We are sceptical, however, as to whether these studies'
IVs are excludable and therefore do not believe that their evidence reflects the causal effect of aid on military expenditure.
We apply a new instrumental variable for aid that has been proposed by Dreher and Langlotz (2015) in their study of aid and growth. More specifically, we use the interaction of donor government 1 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11654852/British-aid-billions-subsidising-third-worlddefence-budgets.html (accessed on December 7, 2015) . fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid as an IV. Whereas donor government fractionalization introduces variation over time, the recipient country's probability of receiving aid provides cross-country variation. The interaction term consequently varies across both time and recipient countries. To the extent that donor government fractionalization affects bilateral aid through its effects on total government spending and thus through the overall aid budget, it has been found to be a powerful IV (Dreher and Langlotz 2015) . We use the resulting excludable IV to identify the causal effects of development aid on military expenditure in recipient countries. Finding an effect of ODA on military expenditure would provide evidence for development aid being shifted to purposes other than those intended. Since military aid is not reportable as ODA, ODA should by definition not subsidize the recipient country's military. The study thus elaborates on whether aid is fungible rather than investigating the relationship between military aid and military expenditure. Analysing the fungibility of aid implies a focus on development aid, which is given with explicitly non-military purposes. 2 In fact, data on military aid are only available for the United States, but not for the other donor countries we examine. We thus control for US military aid to avoid omitted variable bias when estimating the effect of ODA on military expenditure.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 discusses previous studies on the effect of aid on military expenditure. Section 3 describes the data and identification strategy, while Section 4 presents the main results. We discuss robustness tests and heterogeneous effects in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
Previous studies on aid and military expenditure
ODA aims to promote development in recipient countries and officially excludes funds meant to arm recipient countries. One question, however, is to what extent ODA is fungible. Scholars investigate whether governments in recipient countries use ODA on projects other than those the transfers were originally intended for. 3 One example for the fungibility of aid is to divert development aid to the military. Some previous studies examined whether increasing development aid gives rise to higher military expenditure. Those studies differ regarding the type of data (cross-sectional or panel data versus data for individual countries) and regarding the identification strategy (correlations versus attempts to identify causal effects).
Cross-sectional and panel data studies elaborating on correlations between aid and military expenditure do not suggest that aid and military expenditure are positively associated. Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) disentangle how different types of aid (e.g., loans and grants, bilateral and multilateral aid) are correlated with non-defence and defence public expenditure in a dataset of 46 less developed countries over the [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] period. Defence expenditure is not correlated with highly conditional IMF disbursements, DAC bilateral ODA loan disbursements, DAC bilateral ODA grants, and local currency disbursements, and negatively correlated with low conditional IMF disbursements and IMF commodity disbursements. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) examine how aid correlates with budget composition in recipient countries by using panel data for 38 developing countries over the [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period. They use different types of government expenditure such as spending on defence (as a share of GDP) as dependent variables. The most important explanatory variables are the share of net disbursements of total foreign aid and net disbursements of foreign aid to individual sectors such as education or health (both measured as a share of GDP). The results do not show that more aid is associated with higher military expenditure.
On the contrary, studies focussing on individual countries show that US aid, in particular, is correlated with military expenditure in recipient countries. For example, US aid to Israel is used to increase military expenditure (McGuire 1982 and 1987) and US aid to Pakistan is used for higher military and non-military expenditure (Khilji and Zampelli 1991) . However, the previous studies by McGuire (1982 and 1987) and Khilji and Zampelli (1991) are based on very small samples. By using a larger sample of eight major recipient countries over the 1972 -1987 period Khilji and Zampelli (1994 arrive at the same conclusion, namely that US aid is highly fungible and positively correlated to a large extent with military expenditure. 4 There are several reasons why aid should be endogenous with respect to military expenditure.
Endogeneity is likely to result from reversed causality and omitted variable bias. Firstly, causality can be reversed as donor countries observe how recipient countries develop. When a recipient country increases military expenditure, donor countries may well believe that the recipient country will threaten other countries or repress its own people. As a result, donor countries will decrease aid to the individual 4 Dube and Naidu (2016) focus on the effects of US military assistance in Colombia rather than looking at ODA. The authors therefore examine the direct effects of aid intended to support the military of the recipient country. The results indicate that paramilitary attacks increase in the course of more US military assistance, even after controlling for government attacks. By contrast, US military assistance has not been found to influence guerilla warfare. Dube and Naidu (2016) exploit variance across Colombian municipalities that have military bases and, in turn, receive US military aid. However, the results do not show that US aid increases counter-narcotics activities, despite this being the official intention of US assistance to Colombia. recipient country, either to prevent the recipient from misusing the flows or to avoid encouraging governments that do so. Donor countries are usually democracies, and voters in donor countries are likely to punish (vote out of office) the domestic government for providing foreign aid to governments in recipient countries that do not use aid for its intended purposes. Certainly, some recipient countries that increase military expenditure may well do so to protect themselves in the course of a conflict, and not to threaten other countries or its own people. Secondly, a recipient country is likely to increase military expenditure when being in conflict with other countries. When the recipient country is allied with an individual donor country (for example, as a former colony or participating in a pact such as the US Defense Pact -see Leeds et al. 2002) , the allied donor is likely to increase foreign aid in the course of the conflict. Being allied is therefore likely to influence the recipient's military expenditure -apart from its effect through aid -as the recipient expects the allied donor to provide protection. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results would thus be biased because of omitted variables that affect both military expenditure and development aid.
Two studies advanced research on the nexus between aid and military expenditure by using instrumental variables for aid to deal with endogeneity (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Kono and Montinola 2012) . We are, however, sceptical as to whether the proposed IVs are excludable, as we will explain below.
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) examine whether aid increases military expenditure (as a share of GDP) over the 1960-1999 period in 161 recipient countries. When estimating the baseline model by OLS, aid (as a share of GDP) does not turn out to be statistically significant. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) acknowledge that: "aid may be endogenous to the government's chosen level of military spending" (p. 11) and use an IV that considers the extent to which donor and recipient countries are politically, culturally and geographically aligned. To construct the instrumental variables, they focus on bilateral aid outflows of the (then) five largest donor countries (Japan, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). The political, geographic, and cultural distance of each donor from each recipient is measured by four variables. Political distance is proxied for by an index of UN voting affinity (Gartzke and Jo 2002), geographical proximity by the inverse of the distance in kilometres between the capitals of the donor and recipient, and cultural distance by dummy variables capturing common language and common principal religion. Their IV findings show that when aid (as a share of GDP) increases by onepercentage point, military expenditure (as a share of GDP) increases by around 3.3 percent. We are sceptical as to whether Collier and Hoeffler (2007) identify a causal effect of aid on military expenditure since the exclusion restriction is likely to be violated. For instance, recipient countries that are politically, culturally, and geographically close to important donor countries are likely to be supported by donor countries in the course of a conflict. The recipient may therefore be inclined to keep its military small because it expects that the allied donor country will provide protection.
In a similar vein, Kono and Montinola (2012) examine whether aid increases military expenditure, especially by disentangling aid-induced effects between democratic and autocratic recipient countries. They argue that previous studies have not arrived at a consensus, as the effects of aid on military expenditure are not alike for different types of recipient governments. The authors propose that autocratic leaders maintain power by redistributing resources to a small group of influential supporters. The military is an excellent case in point because it safeguards the autocrats' power and repression. By contrast, in democracies, citizens would be expected to protest against rulers who redistribute resources to a small group of supporters. Kono and Montinola (2012) estimate an error-correction model for 109 countries over the 1960-2004 period. The results show that aid increases military expenditure in autocratic recipient countries, but does not influence military expenditure in democratic ones. The effects estimated for pure democratic countries do not turn out to be statistically significant. Kono and Montinola (2012) also deal with the endogeneity of aid by using IVs. They use a measure of foreign policy similarity and higher-order moments of each endogenous explanatory variable as IVs, and arrive at similar results compared to their OLS findings. 5 We are, however, again sceptical as to -whether this measure of foreign policy similarity is exogenous to the dependent variable, military expenditure, for the very same reason as for Collier and Hoeffler (2007) .
Method and data
Our baseline panel data model at the recipient-year-level is:
where , is recipient country 's yearly military expenditure as a share of GDP. We use the new dataset on military expenditure from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which includes data for the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recipient countries over the 1975-2012 period. 6 , ( , −1 ) is the amount of net ODA as a share of GDP 5 The measure of foreign policy similarity is that of Signorino and Ritter (1999) -from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000) . Kono and Montinola (2012) As in Dreher and Langlotz (2015) we follow Frankel and Romer (1999) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) in using a zero-stage regression to predict bilateral aid from an IV that varies over recipient-donor pairs. The zero-stage regression at the recipient-donor-year-level is:
, , = γ 1 , * , + γ 2 , + γ 3 , + γ 4 + , ,
where , , describes the bilateral amount of net ODA (as a share of GDP) from donor disbursed to recipient in year . , * , is Dreher and Langlotz's (2015) proposed IV, which is the interaction of a time-variant variable -donor government fractionalization , -and the recipient country's probability of receiving aid , that varies across donor-recipient pairs. We control for the time-varying level of the IV by including , and we capture the time-invariant level by including donor-recipient-fixed effects , in equation (2). As in equation (1) where , , is a binary variable taking a value of 1 when recipient received a positive amount of aid from donor in year .
From the zero-stage regression at the dyadic-level we first predict ̂, , by using the exogenous variation of the dyadic instrument. We then aggregate the fitted values ̂, , of the zerostage (equation (2)) across all 28 donors, , to compute the aggregated fitted value of aid as a share of GDP (̂, ) at the recipient-year-level:
The aggregation in equation (3) is essential as we can now switch from the dyadic-data-level to the recipient-level, which is the relevant level for the analysis of whether aid influences military expenditure in recipient countries. We use ̂, as an instrument to predict , in equation (1) in order to estimate the causal effects of aid on military expenditure. 12 In this step we revert to the usual 2SLS procedure with the only difference being that we first constructed the instrument from the bilateral regression equation (2). 13 The dataset of our baseline specification includes 124 recipient countries over the 1975-2012 period. 14 Standard errors are clustered at the recipient-level.
Dreher and Langlotz (2015) explain in detail why the interaction of government fractionalization with the probability of receiving aid is likely to be a powerful IV. While government fractionalization is likely to increase government expenditure, government expenditure is likely to increase the aid budget, therefore increasing bilateral amounts of ODA. Roubini and Sachs (1989) , Volkerink and de Haan (2001) , Scartascini and Crain (2002), and Martin and Vanberg (2013) show that higher government fractionalization gives rise to higher government expenditure. This effect can be explained by logrolling, which is likely to occur in coalition governments during the budgeting process, as all government parties are interested in getting their favored projects financed (common pool problem). Higher government expenditure has been shown to increase aid budgets of a donor country (Round and Odedokun 2004, Brech and Potrafke 2014) . Dreher and Fuchs's (2011) study completes the channel from fractionalization to bilateral aid disbursements by showing that higher aid budgets translate into higher bilateral aid disbursements. 15 On the other hand, the probability of receiving aid is likely to influence the extent to 12 In analogy, we use use ̂, −1 as an instrument to predict , −1 in equation (1). 13 Wooldridge (2010) describes that IV estimates and standard errors are still consistently estimated when using a generated instrument if the condition holds that the second-stage error term is not correlated with the variables that we use to generate the instrument. We do, however, also test our first-and second-stage results with bootstrapped standard errors based on pairwise recipient country clusters. Standard errors at the zero-stage regression are clustered at the recipient-donor-level. 14 Following Dreher and Langlotz (2015), we include recipient countries that have been on at least one "DAC List of ODA Recipients" between 1997 and 2013. The list of the 28 donor countries and 124 recipient countries is reported in Appendix A, Table A3 . 15 See Dreher and Langlotz (2015) for a detailed discussion on the choice of the IV, its excludability, and the channels from government fractionalization to bilateral aid. Dreher and Langlotz (2015) discuss this channel from which changes in government fractionalization affect bilateral aid disbursements. Nunn and Qian (2014), Dreher and Langlotz (2015) , and Ahmed (2016a) show that the probability of receiving aid is significantly correlated with the total amount of aid receipts per recipient country.
Dreher and Langlotz's IV approach is based on Werker et al. (2009), Nunn and Qian (2014) , and Ahmed (2016a) , who use plausibly excludable IVs by interacting a time-variant variable with a countryvariant variable. 16 The recipient country's probability of receiving aid is clearly endogenous, but the interaction with an exogenous variable -in our case, government fractionalization -is exogenous when controlling for the levels of the interaction term through year-and country-fixed effects (Nunn and Qian 2014, Bun and Harrison 2014) . We deal with the endogenous level of the interaction term (the timeinvariant probability of receiving aid) by including donor-recipient-fixed effects in the zero-stage regression. 17 In this regard our approach differs from the studies we have criticised for their IV approaches relying on distance or proximity measures. While the probability of receiving aid resembles such a proximity measure, we capture the level of the probability by including fixed effects and we are left with the interaction term only. 18 As in Nunn and Qian (2014) the technique resembles a differencein-difference approach, where we compare the effect of aid on military expenditure in regular and irregular recipients of aid when donor government fractionalization changes. The exclusion restriction would be violated if we omitted a variable that is correlated with donor government fractionalization and that affects military expenditure differently in regular and irregular recipient countries after having controlled for the covariates, the levels of the interaction term, country-and year-fixed effects. Indeed, military aid is likely to be affected by the instrument analogously to development aid. Since data on military aid is only available for the United States, we can only control for a fraction of military aid by all DAC donors. The results remain robust to the inclusion of military aid and the power of the instrument government fractionalization to bilateral aid in more detail and provide empirical testing of the hypotheses on the channel. 16 Werker et al. (2009) examine the effect of aid disbursements from Arab donors -which are induced by changes in oil prices -on growth in Muslim recipient countries. Nunn and Qian (2014) identify the effects of food aid induced by changes in US wheat production on conflict in the recipient country, and Ahmed (2016a) investigates the effect of US aid induced by changes in US legislature fractionalization on repression in the recipient country. 17 After aggregating over all donors, we are still left with the exogenous variation introduced through the timevarying interaction term only. The levels of the interaction term are captured by the fixed effects at the first and second-stage since donor government fractionalization is the same for all recipients and the probability of receiving aid is still perfectly multicollinear to the country-fixed effects. 18 In a robustness test we replace the time-invariant probability of receiving aid with a time-varying measure. In order to do so, we compute the probability at four-year periods. In that case we have to control for the level of the time-varying probability, as it is no longer captured by year-fixed effects. Results at the different stages (zero-, first-and second-stage) of the regression model remain robust. remains high. Apart from military aid, we are not aware of other variables that are likely to violate the exclusion restriction. 19 Following Dreher and Langlotz (2015), we argue that our Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
is representative for the effects of overall bilateral aid provided by a broad set of donor countries to a broad set of recipient countries. We do not expect that aid induced by changes in donor government fractionalization affects military expenditure in recipient countries differently than aid in general.
Main results
Panel A of Table 1 shows the results with the OLS estimates for comparison using contemporaneous aid in columns (1)-(3) and lagged aid in columns (4)-(6). 20 In three out of six regressions, aid is not statistically significant at conventional levels when estimating the panel data model by OLS (including country-and year-fixed effects). This result is in line with Collier and Hoeffler's finding (2007, (3)). However, in columns (2), (3), and (5) there is a slightly negative effect, statistically significant at the 5-to 10-percent-level. A one-percentage point increase in the aid to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.011-0.015-percentage point decrease in the share of military expenditures to GDP.
For the average country in our sample this represents a change in military expenditure of less than one percent. Economically speaking, the OLS findings point to a zero and if at all to a negative effect of aid on military spending, which is negligibly small. Table 1 shows the coefficient estimates of the instrumented aid variable of the second-stage, Panel C provides the reduced form estimates, and Panel D presents the first-stage results.
Panel B of
Before turning to the second-stage results at the recipient-level, it is important to note that the bilateral instrument is statistically significant at the 1-percent-level in the bilateral zero-stage regression. A change of donor government fractionalization from 0 to 1 gives rise to an increase of 0.20-percentage points in bilateral aid (as a share of GDP) in regular recipient countries. The effect reduces to 0.1percentage points for recipient countries that receive positive amounts of aid in only 50 percent of the years. With an average bilateral aid to GDP ratio of 0.14 percent the effect is large. We aggregate the 19 See Dreher and Langlotz (2015) for a detailed discussion on potential channels that could violate the exclusion restriction. Despite having another dependent variable, the tested channels of trade and economic freedom are also relevant in our case. If changes in donor fractionalization affected military spending in the recipient country through those channels as well -with a differential effect according to the recipient's probability of receiving aidour exclusion restriction would be violated. Dreher and Langlotz (2015) do not find evidence for such an impact through the tested channels. 20 We do not show the covariates in the tables in order to reduce clutter. Full regression results for our main specifications (Table 1) are presented in Appendix B (Table B9 and B10). fitted bilateral aid to GDP over all donors and use this exogenous source of variation to predict the causal effect of aid on military expenditure in Table 1 , Panel B. The aid variable is statistically significant at the 5-percent-level in all six specifications. The IV results indicate that aid increases military expenditure. The coefficient estimate varies between 0.05 and 0.24, generally with smaller effects when aid is lagged by one year. For the average recipient country, a one-percentage point increase in the aid to GDP ratio amounts to a maximum increase in military expenditure by 8 percent (Table 1, Interestingly, the partial leverage plot in Figure 1 shows that the results in Panel B are likely to be driven by one major outlying country, which is Liberia. Over the 1975-2012 period Liberia has experienced many years of violence during its first (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) and second civil war (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
Moreover, bilateral aid disbursements have been volatile in Liberia. In 1994, for instance, Liberia spent about 30 percent of its GDP on the military with its aid to GDP ratio amounting to 27 percent in the same year (for a more detailed discussion on the outlying countries see Appendix C: Case studies on Liberia and Israel). We therefore run the baseline regressions excluding Liberia. The coefficient estimates of development aid remain positive in all columns, but lack statistical significance. Table 2 shows the results of the same specifications as in Table 1 when excluding Liberia. The first-stage coefficients remain similar to those in Table 1 and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics remain large. When excluding Liberia we find no evidence that aid affects military expenditure in the overall sample. 
Robustness
In a first robustness test, we replace ODA with a measure of total flows consisting of ODA and Other Official Flows (OOF). 21 Contrary to ODA, OOF also includes flows by the official sector with a grant element of less than 25 percent, or flows that are not primarily aimed at development. Table B1 in Appendix B shows that the results remain robust to the inclusion of OOF. 22 F-statistics clearly remain above the critical value of ten in all specifications. The effects in Table B1 are similar to those reported in Table 1 when using ODA only. Similarly to the results in Table 1 , we find that Liberia significantly drives the positive effects. Excluding Liberia from the regression analysis renders the coefficient of aid to lack statistical significance as in Table 2 .
In Table B2 we add log of population, gross national expenditure/GDP, and government ideology as additional covariates. Since the major outlying observations (Liberia 1975 (Liberia , 1976 (Liberia , and 1994 are not included in these specifications because of missing values in the additional covariates, the coefficients of 21 In order to predict the total flows (ODA+OOF) in the first-stage regression, we replace the probability of receiving ODA with the probability of receiving either ODA and/or OOF. 22 Results for arms imports (Table B5 ) remain robust to using total flows (ODA+OOF) as an explanatory variable. Second Stage development aid again lack statistical significance but remain positive. We can thus not confirm that aid is diverted to the military. 23 In Table B3 we control for US military aid, which may be one major omitted variable. What is more, the exclusion restriction could be violated because our instrumental variable might also affect the dependent variable through military aid. Our results at the zero-, first-, and second-stage remain, however, robust to the results presented in Table 1 .
In another robustness test in Finally, in Table B5 we use arms imports as an alternative dependent variable that captures the size of military activity in a recipient country. The OLS results point to an increasing effect of ODA on arms imports, significant at the 5-to 10-percent-level. However, the effect lacks statistical significance when using the IV approach.
Heterogeneous effects
Aid might affect military expenditure differently across recipient countries with different policies and institutions and across different types of donors. The degree to which aid is fungible and the need to subsidize the military might depend on recipient and donor countries' characteristics. We therefore investigate whether the effect of development aid on military expenditure differs in democracies versus autocracies, corrupt versus less corrupt countries, conflict-ridden versus peaceful countries, low versus middle and high income countries, and across different types of donor countries.
Political institutions
Kono and Montinola (2012) (2012) findings. While we mainly find no significant effects (and, if significant, negative effects) in the democratic country sub-sample, the effects turn significantly positive in the nondemocratic country sub-sample. When we instead only include autocratic countries with a Polity IV index of smaller than or equal to -6 rather than including both, autocratic and so-called anocracies, the coefficient estimates of development aid are positive and statistically significant in columns (1) to (4) but lack statistical significance in columns (5) and (6). As in the baseline specification in Table 1 , the significantly positive effect in the non-democratic sub-sample vanishes when we exclude Liberia.
Though, the sign of the coefficient remains positive in non-democracies. When having a closer look at the democratic sub-sample we again find that an individual country drives the results, namely Israel.
When excluding Israel from the democratic sub-sample, the coefficient estimates of development aid do not turn out to be statistically significant. 27 Consequently, we cannot confirm Kono and Montinola's (2012) findings.
Corruption
Following Gupta et al. (2001) corrupt recipients are likely to spend a higher share of their GDP on military expenditure than less corrupt countries. For example, arms imports are likely to increase when governments in arms-receiving countries are prone to bribes. Military affairs are usually dealt with in secrecy, therefore making corruption difficult to reveal (see Gupta et al. 2001 for a more detailed 25 We use the proposed thresholds of the Polity IV index of larger than/equal to 6 for democratic, smaller than/equal to -6 for autocratic countries, and values in-between for anocracies. 26 Kono and Montinola (2012) use three different indices: the Polity IV index, the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's (2010) measure of the winning coalition size. It is worth noting that their findings vary according to the choice of the index. In order to split the sample, we use the proposed thresholds of the Polity IV index of larger than/equal to 6 for democratic and smaller than/equal to -6 for autocratic countries. As there are no broadly accepted thresholds for the two other continuous measures used by Kono and Montinola (2012), we do not want to overemphasize these results. When splitting the sample according to the UDS measure at zero (larger than zero for democratic and smaller than/equal to zero for autocratic countries), we find evidence for a significantly positive effect in three out of six specifications in the non-democratic sub-sample even after excluding Liberia. When we split the sample according to a winning coalition size of larger than 0.5 for democratic and smaller than/equal to 0.5 for non-democratic countries, we find no significant effects, neither in nondemocracies nor in democracies when we exclude Liberia. We prefer to use the Polity IV democracy index, as it has a clear threshold. 27 In two out of six specifications, we find a positive effect, statistically significant at the 10-percent-level. The effect is driven by an additional recipient country: Sri Lanka. When excluding both Israel and Sri Lanka, the coefficient estimate of aid lacks statistical significance in all six specifications. discussion). That is why both foreign and domestic firms may try to bribe governments in recipient countries. We can thus expect development aid to subsidize the military to a higher extent in corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries.
We therefore split the sample according to the ICRG corruption index. Since there is no clear cut-off value for high and low corruption, we split the sample according to the median with higher values indicating less corruption. Countries above the median are classified as less corrupt and countries below the median are classified as corrupt countries. Tables B7a and B7b show However, the average corruption score in the two sub-samples differs only by one point, with a mean value of 2.1 for the corrupt sub-sample and 3.1 in the less corrupt sub-sample. This indicates that splitting the sample at the median leads to two sub-samples, which have on average rather similar corruption scores. We therefore tested the effect of ODA on military expenditure in countries with a corruption score of higher than 4 to capture less corrupt countries more clearly. As expected, the positive coefficient estimates lack statistical significance in this sub-sample. Taken together, we do not find clear evidence that aid is diverted to the military to a higher extent in corrupt recipient countries compared to less corrupt countries.
Conflicts and low-income countries
We have also split the sample according to whether the recipient country experiences a domestic or interstate conflict because countries involved in international and civil wars generally have higher military expenditure than countries not exposed to armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008) . In particular, the threat of international wars increases military expenditure according to Nordhaus et al. (2012) . We would expect that countries involved in conflicts are more prone to divert aid to the military than countries at peace. Results in the two sub-samples, however, do not differ, suggesting that aid is not more likely to be diverted to the military in conflict-ridden countries than in countries at peace.
Moreover, we investigate whether low-income compared to middle-or high-income recipient countries have a different likelihood in diverting aid to the military. One may well expect that highincome countries (which are often democracies) are less likely to divert aid to the military. However, previous studies have arrived at different conclusions regarding the association between income and military expenditure. GDP per capita is positively correlated with military expenditure in large sample studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Nordhaus et al. 2012 ), but negatively correlated in a smaller sample of developing countries (Dunne et al. 2008) . Again, after controlling for the major outliers, the effects of aid on military expenditure do not differ in low-compared to middle-and high-income countries. 28
Donor types
We follow Dietrich (2016) in examining heterogeneous effects across different types of donor countries.
Donor countries have been found to differ substantially in the types of aid they give and the channels they use for aid delivery. Some donor countries prefer to bypass aid through non-state actors as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations, while other donor countries prefer government-to-government aid. Dietrich (2016) argues that the extent to which donors bypass aid depends on "different national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service delivery" (p. 65). She classifies the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries as liberal market economies (LME). 29 On the contrary, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium are classified as coordinated market economies (CME). LMEs have been found to provide much larger shares of bypass aid than CMEs.
We use this distinction and split the sample at the bilateral level according to the two donor types. We estimate the effect of aid on military expenditure for LME and CME donors (Tables B8a and   B8b ). Our instrument remains relevant for both donor groups showing that the first stage results are not driven by an individual donor or by specific groups of donors. Interestingly, we find that aid from CMEs has a significantly positive effect on military expenditure, even after excluding Liberia and after controlling for the longer list of covariates from Table B2 . 30 The results on contemporaneous effects do not depend on individual observations (columns (1)-(3) in Table B8b ). 31 In columns (5) and (6), however, where we measure aid in year − 1, results lack statistical significance when we exclude Angola, Eritrea, and Liberia at the same time. The numerical meaning of the estimated effects is that when the aid to 28 Results are available on request. We have used the country classification of the World Bank to split the recipients into low-and middle/high-income countries. 29 Dietrich (2016) does not include Iceland in her analysis. We include Iceland in the group of Scandinavian donors and thus in the liberal market economy category. 30 When we bootstrapped standard errors based on pairwise recipient country clusters, the effects in columns (1)-(5) remain statistically significant at the 10-percent-level. 31 We also excluded Angola, Eritrea, and Oman, which are likely to be the most influential countries according to the partial leverage plot, and the effects still remain significantly positive.
GDP ratio increases by one-percentage point, military expenditure as a share of GDP increases by about 0.15-to 0.26-percentage points in the most stringent specifications (columns (3) and (6) in Table B8b ).
For the LMEs we do not find a positive effect of aid on military expenditure, the inclusion and exclusion of Liberia notwithstanding. We examine whether the Scandinavian donors, who are often described as being good donors especially in comparison to the Anglo-American donor countries, drive the results for the LMEs. Results for the LME group remain robust to the exclusion of the Scandinavian donors. It is conceivable that aid from CME donors increases military expenditure but aid from LME donors does not influence military expenditure because LMEs and CMEs differ in their relative provision of bypass aid. As the LME donor countries are supposed to deliver higher shares of aid through non-state actors, aid is less likely to be captured by the government for the purpose of financing the military.
Conclusion
Many empirical studies suggest that aid is not effective, for example, in increasing economic growth or supporting governance (e.g., Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008 , 2011 , Dreher and Langlotz 2015 . A prime example is that governments in recipient countries use aid to finance military expenditure, rather than We are, however, sceptical as to whether the previous studies derived causal effects of development aid on military expenditure, since the IVs they used are arguably not excludable (cultural and political proximity between donor and recipient countries). We have therefore used a new IV strategy and new data on military expenditure for 124 recipient countries over the 1975-2012 period. The instrument is the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid, an IV that was proposed by Dreher and Langlotz (2015).
The results indicate that development aid increases military expenditure in the full sample, at the 5-percent-level of significance. Inferences for the overall sample depend, however, on one outlying country: Liberia. When excluding Liberia, the coefficient estimates of the instrumented development aid variable remain positive, but do not reach statistical significance. We have also used arms imports as a dependent variable. When estimating the model by OLS, the results indicate that development aid and arms imports are positively correlated. By contrast, when estimating the model by 2SLS, development aid does not turn out to be statistically significant. These results suggest that using our new IV strategy to identify the causal effects of development aid is useful in avoiding inferences that are likely to be based on biased and inconsistent estimates such as OLS estimates.
Investigating heterogeneous effects according to autocracies and democracies corroborates the finding that two outliers -Liberia in the sample of non-democratic countries and Israel in the sample of democratic countries -drive the results. Considering our finding that including/excluding Liberia and/or Israel drastically changes the results, and therefore the conclusions that can be drawn, we posit that any study examining whether development aid influences military spending should explicitly state whether either of these two countries are included/excluded.
We have split the sample by donor types as proposed by Dietrich (2016). Liberal market economies (LMEs, e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia) have been found to provide much larger shares of bypass aid than coordinated market economies (CMEs, e.g., France, Germany, Japan). Our results show that aid provided by CMEs increases military expenditure, an effect being robust to excluding outlying countries. A one-percentage point increase in the aid-to-GDP ratio leads to about a 10 percent increase in military expenditure (share of GDP) for the average recipient country.
When we measure aid in year − 1 instead of year , the aid-induced effect is smaller and does not turn out to be statistically significant in some specifications. We propose that because the LME donor countries are supposed to deliver higher shares of aid through non-state actors, aid is less likely to be captured by the government for the purpose of financing the military.
Since specific types of aid including aid through different delivery channels are likely to affect military expenditure in different ways, future research should investigate which individual types and delivery channels of aid are more likely to be linked to a diversion to the military; the implication being that donors should grant any of the types identified with greater caution. Scholars who examine whether development aid is fungible in ways other than by diversion to the recipient's military and scholars examining aid effectiveness would be advised to consider specific types and delivery channels of aid as well as specific groups of donor countries.
Table 1 Main results
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient-and year-fixed effects are included. All first-and secondstage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level in Panel A, B and C and at the donorrecipient-country-level in Panel D; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01).
( Expenditure/GDP Gross national expenditure (percent of GDP).
WDI (2015)
Fitted Aid/GDP Instrumental variable, constructed from the bilateral zero-stage regression.
Own construction

Fractionalization (Frac)
Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be from different parties.
Database of Political
Institutions ( Neighbor ME Neighbor military expenditure as a share of total neighbor GDP.
WDI (SIPRI) (2016)
(ODA+OOF)/GDP Total official flows by country (ODA+OOF), current prices (USD) divided by recipient GDP.
OECD (2015), WDI (2015)
Government ideology (leftwing)
Government ideology with respect to economic policy: Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No information (0).
Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al. 2001) Polity IV democracy Polity IV democracy index, ranges from -10 to 10: Autocracies (-10 to -6); Democracies (6 to 10); Anocracies (-5 to 5).
Polity IV (2015 Table B11 Additional covariates full regressions, IV Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient-and year-fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). These are the full regression results of Table B2 .
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Figure 2: Correlation between ODA/GDP and military expenditure/GDP per period, Liberia
Notes: r is the correlation coefficient between military expenditure and aid (both as a share of GDP) for the respective period.
Our second major outlying country is Israel. Israel is a developed OECD country that has been a democracy with recurring elections since the establishment of the modern state in 1948. The aid-to- and Egypt, with Egypt receiving two-thirds of any aid given to Israel. In general, US military aid to Israel has been larger than ODA throughout the observation period. In 2004, for example, US ODA was about 0.4 percent of Israeli GDP compared to a much higher share of US military aid, which reached about 2.1 percent of Israeli GDP. In order to avoid increasing the official amount of military aid even further and to 32 We specifically look at the 1977-2004 period since aid has been quite small before 1977 and no aid was provided after 2004. -1988; r=0.813 1991-1994; r=0.842 2004-2012 ; r=-0.446 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 Aid/GDP Liberia Correlation: Military Expenditure/GDP and Aid/GDP per Period 43 reduce the gap between military aid and ODA, the governments might have agreed to declare military aid as ODA. We conjecture that a large share of the ODA provided by the United States to Israel was intended as military aid from the very beginning.
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Figure 3: Correlation between ODA/GDP and military expenditure/GDP per period, Israel
Both Israel and Liberia have been involved in conflicts for many years. We control for conflict in our econometric model, but may not have captured the true military threat that Liberia and Israeli face.
Consequently, both recipient countries are likely to have diverted as many resources as possible (including ODA) to the military. 1977-2004; r=0.809 1975-2012; r=0.529 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 Aid/GDP Israel Correlation: Military Expenditure/GDP and Aid/GDP per Period
